Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers
DoB:
3 September 1928
DoD:
12 August 2001
MCSN:
0-61169
Home of Record:
Sumney Town, Pennsylvania
Final Rank:
Lieutenant Colonel
Last MOS:
0302-Infantry Officer
Years of Service in the U.S. Marine Corps:
1953-1979
A magnificent grouping of items once belonging to then-Major Lane Rogers, a distinguished commissioned officer in the United States Marine Corps. Rogers entered military service during the Korean War era and later served as an advisor to the Vietnamese Marine Corps, completing at least one tour in Vietnam during the early stages of American involvement, from 1964 to 1965. The grouping comprises several pieces of uniform and headwear, assorted paperwork and ephemera, original artwork, photographs, and a large USMC flag.
The P44 HBT jacket is named to Rogers above the breast pocket and beneath the collar. It displays clear signs of service wear, including staining and several missing buttons. Two pieces of headwear are also present. The first is a green beret, manufactured by Mai-Anh Tailors in Saigon and bearing an early bullion Vietnamese Marine Corps beret flash. The second is a tailor-made eight-point utility cover constructed from so-called “Vietnamese Marine Corps Transitional” (VMT) tigerstripe fabric.
Rogers also appears to have been a keen artist, with four original drawings included in the grouping. These depict a German U-boat; a portrait of a German U-boat commander; a U.S. soldier plunging a bayonet into a German soldier; and, finally, two U.S. soldiers, one holding his helmet after it has seemingly just been blown from his head while the other looks on in amazement.
Two photographs are also included, both showing U.S. Marines and French airmen inspecting a German MG 151/20 20mm cannon mounted aboard a French H-34 “Pirate” helicopter.
The accompanying paperwork includes four certificates documenting Rogers’ appointments to the ranks of Second Lieutenant, First Lieutenant, Captain, and Major, together with a certificate commemorating his crossing of the 180th meridian. Finally, the grouping contains an issue of Time magazine featuring an article in which Rogers appears alongside a Vietnamese counterpart, accompanied by an account of an interview with him.
The final item in the grouping is a cassette tape containing a recording of an interview with Rogers, conducted on 11 January 1966. During the interview, Rogers describes in great detail a major four-day operation in which he accompanied the 3rd Vietnamese Marine Battalion west of Mỹ Tho. There, they engaged a heavily fortified VC training battalion, suffering six killed and around 35 wounded while inflicting at least 106 enemy deaths before the surviving Viet Cong escaped through a gap in the encirclement.
The entire transcribed interview is reproduced below. It has never previously been released to the public, and this is the first time it has been published.
Beyond the transcription are other records including the Time magazine interview, the description from his Silver Star, an appearance in the book "U.S. Marines in Vietnam - The landing and Buildup 1965", and his obituary.
Original audio recording
https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0586/1539/8563/files/Lane_Rogers_Tape.mp3?v=1789111169
Tape Transcript
GySgt: Conducted with Major Lane Rogers by Gunnery Sergeant (Ford N. Jordan [?]) at Marine Corps Schools, Quantico Virginia, on 11 January 1966. The subject of this interview is Delta Operations, Viet Cong tactics, and it is unclassified. Could you state your name and grade, and service number, please, sir?
Rogers: I’m Major Lane Rogers, U.S. Marine Corps, 061169.
GySgt: What were your duty assignments while you were in Vietnam, sir?
Rogers: Well, I was the advisor to the 3rd Battalion, Vietnamese Marine Corps
GySgt: What period did you serve in these units [?]?
Rogers: I was serving in the ___ from 5 June 1964 to 5 June 1965.
GySgt: Where were you physically located within Vietnam during this period, sir?
Rogers: We were in approximately eight different locations, but I would say, generally, the first six months, we spent in the delta area. In the month of December, we spent in Phú Quốc Island. In January, we were operating generally in the area between Saigon and Lòng Tàu. In February, we went to Da Nang. In the latter stage of February and March, we were in the Long Sơn-Qui Nhơn area [?], then we went back to Da Nang, and then we returned to Saigon for Capital Military District duty.
GySgt: Would you describe, sir, any major combat actions in which you participated, giving the dates, locations, and _____________.
Rogers: I think one of the most significant operations that we had - we had eight major engagements during the years that I was with the 3rd Battalion was in mid-November of 1964, and this was when we were operating with the 7th ARVN Army Division in the area of Mỹ Tho. We were operating generally west of Mỹ Tho, along the Mekong. The overall plan was (we as the)... the Viet Cong had established a pattern of operations and they would come in in battalion strength from the Plain of Reeds area, and we were able, through our intelligence sources, we were able to track them in such a fashion that we knew approximately when they were in the area, and approximately what strength, and we thought we were able to identify the units.
So, after a period of about three weeks of fixing ___ operations, we ran a probe to find out if somebody was in the area or not, and we launched a full scale offensive in which we participated as a Marine landing force - the whole battalion operated in this fashion. Basically, the situation on - if I remember correctly - the operation started on 17 November and lasted for four days.
We established a counter-plan by sending aircraft with leaflets and artillery prep, and so forth and so on, in one area; then we ___ the Division Commander offset the operation by about 5,000 meters. Unfortunately so, because the Viet Cong in that area had a tendency to follow up on our preparations. If we dropped leaflets in that area, then they’d get out. If we fired artillery prep into that area, then they’d get out. So, by that offset [?], we were able to basically entrap the VC battalion ___.
My battalion mounted up; it was the river assault group at practically 0330 from Mỹ Tho, and we headed up the Mekong. The actual, physical landing was at approximately 0630 in the morning, and it was initially unopposed, there was no contact.
Five other army battalions formed the inland portion of the operation ___ allegedly, a semi-hammer-and-anvil type tactic, but it did not evolve as that by the time we got finished in that, one side of the trap was open. So, by the end of the first day, the Army moved another battalion in by helicopter to try and pick up the remnants of the battalion that they engaged.
As we proceeded up a small tributary on foot, at the first bend that we came to, we ran into intense small-arms fire and picked up our first casualty for the day. We had 17 people hit and lost two. One platoon commander, right between the horns, right off the bat.
At this time, the VC sent a squad ___ to our right flank, which apparently was a ruse. They were trying to draw us off from the main position, and our flank security picked up the squad and killed three of them. Two that we know of escaped, and its undetermined about the rest. I’d like to point out at this time, in this area - the delta - the only possible navigation is either small-boat navigation or foot navigation. Inland, I don’t think you could even move an Amtrac; it's a very heavy mangrove-type swamp, and certainly no mechanised form[?] at all could move in there.
It’s also very difficult when performing a medevac; the only medevacs you can get out with are by small boat, which causes our second problem, because the river assault group sent some small armoured assault boats up to assist us, and the instructions which we gave the commander, and which he understood, became confused as they went down the line, so that the second, third, and fourth boats in line, instead of firing to the left, which would have been to our front, fired both to the left and right, and we sustained twelve more casualties due to the small arms-fire; fortunately, only two were serious.
By this time, we knew that we literally had a tiger by the tail because we had two companies engaged ___ against the target, which was across the stream. The stream was about thirty to forty meters wide, and it was really too deep for fording, you could swim across it, but we had no boats, so we were committed in a more walking operation.
We called an Army battalion up on our left flank, which was across the stream; they couldn't get into position, and we found out later why, and it was that the ___ were about 500 meters on the side, with three belts of defensive fortifications, all of which were fortified. The CP had been waterproofed and dug in, which we found to be quite unusual because of the water table being so low in the delta; the VC don’t usually go to this extent. We found out subsequently that this was a ___ training battalion, and I’m glad to say we permanently interrupted their training.
As the operation progressed, our two lead companies started to run out of ammunition. We were receiving 57 recoilless fire, and we were receiving light mortar fire. Because of the dense terrain, we were having trouble adjusting our artillery, and we finally had to terminate our artillery fire when we were getting some awfully close rounds. I have to point out the fact that the VC were about 60 meters away from us.
We couldn’t see them, and they couldn’t see us, but obviously we could see where the fire was coming from, and so could they. We executed a relief by spacing our two additional companies up ___, and withdrawing our companies that were exhausted and they had exhausted their ammunition.
And to get all our casualties out ___, in the end we had about 35 wounded and six dead, if I remember correctly. We were able to employ our ___ we expended everything we had. The Army units still to our left flank still were not able to get across the canal [?] ___ … into the position, and we were not able to get across the river into their position, it being broad daylight.
The firefight, which initially started about ten o’clock, didn’t really let up until 1500, and at this time we had elements of the Army 62nd Aviation Company armed Hueys come in, and because of our proximity to the VC, we were able to pretty accurately mark for them. One thing I’d like to point out is that when Vietnamese Marines are concerned, they are helicopter-oriented, and they do a really fine job because we later had the opportunity to call Hueys down to 25 meters in front of us, and they were hauling [?] ___.
The rest of that day was composed of straight Huey strikes until approximately 1630, when we had enough aircraft overhead, and we locked [?] them in. Fortunately, because of the stream between the VC and us, we were partial ___; the VC target area was clearly defined___…
____________________________________________________________________________
… clusters. None of the ordnance that we dropped was heavy stuff: no 500 pounders, no 750s, and the effect was highly significant.
By nightfall, which then, at that season, was at about, I’d say, 1830, the perimeter was pretty well closed. We had the stream still sealed off on our side; the Army battalion on our left had fairly well closed the box, and the other Army battalions, which would be in front of us, in fact, were starting to close the ring, and the entire area in which the VC were compressed was to be a square about, I would estimate at that time, about a thousand to 1,500 meters on a side.
Now, unfortunately, when the last walking battalion was helo-lifted in, they were lifted in too late; they were not able to fully tie in their perimeter security. ___, that’s for one specific reason. VC are able, very quickly, to find unit weaknesses. If a perimeter has been drawn around them, they’ll find a hole. And as soon as they find a hole, as soon as it gets dark ___, its dug out, and they’ll go out through that hole. This is exactly what happened, because all that night, we were directing artillery into their position. We established a 360-degree perimeter because we expected ___ infiltrators and ___ the other units could come up behind us, but by the next morning the VC had gone.
The body count on the position. They left 106 bodies behind. We captured - we did capture three, all of which were dressed in civilian clothes and were certainly on their way out. One of the significant people that we captured was the woman commissary officer of the unit, and when we picked her up, she was very casually walking out through the perimeter when we went in. She just was not dressed like most people in that area, her accent was a little bit off. We took her into custody, she later identified the unit, and identified the ___.
Some of the bodies that we picked up were hard-core VC and were members of the training cadre. We captured about 400 pounds of literature, over half of which was devoted to how to shoot down a helicopter. From the bodies that were left in the position, you could tell that the Hueys had really done a fine job.
In coordinating on the position, we found that the Huey, because of its superior radio, makes a wonderful antenna, and you can control them so quickly and so well that, if you want to employ any other supporting arms - air or artillery - you can get them out of the area and you can get them back in pretty quickly. They’re well up high and you can talk to them - we talked to Hueys up to 15 miles on 10s (PRC-10s). I’m cautionary about using them, though, ___. If you have too many units using 10s and the frequencies are too close, one, you’ll block each other out, and secondly, (if) a Huey comes on here, he blocks everybody out, so you have to exercise some caution in this respect.
That’s most of it. Can I fill you in on any other information?
GySgt: I think you’ve covered it very well, sir. Thank you very much.
Top to Bottom right: Silver Star, Bronze Star with "V" Device, Merituous Service, Combat Action, Vietnam Service with bronze star, Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces Honor Medal Second Class, Republic of Vietnam Gallantry Cross Unit Citation
(Source: https://marines.togetherweserved.com/usmc/servlet/tws.webapp.webapp?cmd=LegacySBV&type=Person&ID=322220)
Silver Star
https://valor.militarytimes.com/recipient/recipient-42353/
The President of the United States of America takes pleasure in presenting the Silver Star to Major Lane Rogers (MCSN: 0-61169), United States Marine Corps, for gallantry in action while serving with friendly foreign forces engaged in armed conflict with an enemy during Operation QUYET THANG 518, in Quang Tin Province, Republic of Vietnam, 18 – 19 April 1965. On 18 April 1965, Major Rogers, Infantry Battalion Advisor to the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion, through his own diligence, personal courage, and with total disregard for his own personal safety was instrumental in dislodging the Viet Cong from excellent defensive positions by inspiring the Vietnamese Marines to continue the impetus of the attack and by coordinating supporting air strikes. On 19 April 1965, when the 3d Vietnamese Marine Battalion made contact with a much stronger Viet Cong force using extremely heavy fire including 4.2 inch mortars, Major Rogers, exposing himself to deadly fire, attempted to steady the unnerved troops and succeeded initially in stopping their withdrawal and in organizing a hasty defense. With continuing heavy enemy mortar and automatic fire, with no friendly artillery fire or air support, command and control disintegrated and the entire task force became immediately in danger of being overrun. Major Rogers organized a small rearguard force of U.S. and Vietnamese Marines, and firing point blank at the onrushing Viet Cong who were now in the process of encircling and outflanking them, slowed the enemy’s advance and inflicted heavy casualties. This delaying action saved the entire task force from total annihilation by allowing the Task Force Commander time to reorganize his forces and fight an orderly withdrawal. Major Rogers’ personal leadership, coolness under extremely heavy fire, disregard for his personal safety, courage and example, and acts of heroism above and beyond the call of duty, prevented this chaotic situation from becoming a crushing Viet Cong victory. The Viet Cong experienced heavy losses, with 53 bodies found and 297 others claimed as killed. By his daring actions and loyal devotion to duty in the face of extreme personal risk, Major Rogers upheld the highest traditions of the United States Naval Service.
U.S. Marines in Vietnam - The landing and Buildup, 1965
by Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, USMC, 15 June 1978. Chapter 14 “Advisors and Other Marine Activities" Page 204-205
(https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20Vietnam_The%20Landing%20and%20the%20Buildup%201965%20%20PCN%2019000307600_1.pdf)
The South Vietnamese Marine Corps (VNMC) had suffered its worst defeat of the war on 31 December 1964, when the 9th VC Division eliminated the 4th Battalion of the VNMC as an effective fighting force near Binh Gia, a Catholic resettlement village 40 miles east of Saigon. Major Lane Rogers, advisor to the 3d VNMC Battalion, who had volunteered on 1 January to go to Binh Gia and assist with the evacuation of the dead and wounded, recalled:
“The next three days were spent searching for bodies; we found more than 100 (friendlies) and no VC. The body hunt was a mess. It was stinking hot and you could not get away from the smell. The third day, after finally getting body bags. We bagged up the 4th Battalion bodies.”
Rogers remembered that Colonel Nguyen Thanh Yen, the Assistant Commandant of the Vietnamese Marine Corps, was in charge of the body recovery operation and had issued "vats of local saki" to the working party, all survivors from the 4th Battalion. The American Marine advisor later remarked:
“We were all sick . . . (and so you can guess what the “bag detail” was like). That evening we loaded troops and bodies into about ten 6x6s and drove off to Vung Tau. As we made the turn at Ba Ria onto Route 15 . . . one of the body bags rolled off one of the trucks. The messy recovery action drew a crowd and the wailing started. The word was out that the 4th Battalion was wiped out.”
The results of Binh Gia were an ominous portent for 1965. MACV and the South Vietnamese command feared that the Viet Cong Communists might be ready to enter into the final phase of their war to take over the country. At the time, no one knew the exact size of the enemy force that had defeated the government units at Binh Gia. Rumors abounded, including one that the VC had been led by a general riding a white horse. Even discounting such stories, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff knew the enemy force had been larger than any encountered before, although it was not until later that MACV learned that the Communists had formed the 9th VC Division from two independent regiments. After clearing the Binh Gia battlefield, the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff ordered a joint airborne and Marine operation to find and destroy the Communist attacking force. In response to the Joint General Staff order, the Vietnamese Marine Brigade launched Operation NGUYEN VAN NHO, named after the slain commander of the 4th Battalion.
General Khang committed all three of his effective infantry battalions (the 5th Battalion was still being formed) to the operation. He maintained one battalion in reserve near the brigade’s headquarters at Vung Tau while establishing a two-battalion task force headquarters under Colonel Yen at Ba Ria (Phouc Le), 14 miles to the north. The two forward battalions then swept a 25-square-mile area extending 10 miles northeast of Ba Ria and including Binh Gia.
The results of the operation, which lasted until 7 February, were disappointing. According to Colonel Nesbit, NGUYEN VAN NHO, under brigade control, revealed the weaknesses of the brigade staff in directing a large force in the field and the “inadequacy of the brigade TO [Table of Organization] for sustained operations.” In order to fully man the advisory staff billets for the two headquarters, FMFPac provided eight Marine officers and 11 enlisted men while MACV sent two officers and seven enlisted men. Although this improvised American advisory staff quickly established itself at Vung Tau “and functioned well,” Colonel Nesbit described the operation “as one of cautious defense, and therefore not eminently successful in destroying VC.”³ Another Marine advisor, Major William G. Leftwich, Jr., called the operation “lethargic” and observed that the task force headquarters played a static role while the “two battalions operated sometimes independently and sometimes in concert.”⁴ Even more bluntly, Major Rogers provided the following description of the operation:
“[Colonel] Yen was TF Commander at Ba Ria, while General Khang commanded from Vung Tau. . . . I was (briefly, thank God) TF advisor to Yen at Ba Ria and did nothing there, nor did Yen. . . . We found no VC, no caches, no traces, nothing. Reportedly the VC were long gone. I was told the Airborne [operating north of the Marines] did find some rice. As for the “VC general,” the “VC Division,” the general’s “white horse,” we never saw a sign.”
Time: Armed Forces: The Fighting American
https://time.com/archive/6627444/armed-forces-the-fighting-american/
The Adviser
MAJOR LANE ROGERS, 36, a lean, dry-humored U.S. Marine Corps regular, has been in Viet Nam for 10½ months as adviser to a Vietnamese marine battalion. He has no command capacity whatever. All he can do is offer suggestions when and if they are solicited by his Vietnamese “counterpart.” To perform effectively, the adviser must earn the trust and friendship of his Vietnamese opposite number—a process that often takes weeks, and sometimes is never achieved. Whenever an American adviser tries to force his views on a Vietnamese commander, he is in for trouble. Thus one overzealous adviser was told by a Vietnamese commander who never spoke to him thereafter, “Just remember, you are an adviser—and nothing else.”
On his first operation, in the Mekong Delta, Major Rogers rolled out of his hammock at 3:30 a.m., marched all day under a brain-beating sun, through paddy fields and up to his armpits in irrigation ditches, ready to give instant advice. The Vietnamese commander barely spoke to him. That night, after washing out his muddy clothes in a canal, Rogers sat patiently waiting to be consulted — but neither offering advice nor being invited to give it.
Next day, as the march continued, Rogers tagged at the heels of the Vietnamese commander. Finally the unit ran into Viet Cong fire while moving along a river bank. Then Rogers’ counterpart turned to him with a question: “What about some air?” Rogers agreed, and while his counterpart radioed for Vietnamese-flown Skyraiders, Rogers called in American-flown helicopters. “Then,” recalls Rogers, “I asked the commander which he wanted to carry out the strike. He said both, and I had to explain that you couldn’t have Skyraiders and choppers going in over the target at the same time. It was a real Mickey Mouse [the linguistic equivalent of World War II’s snafu], but we got it all straightened out, and the choppers went in first.”
Rogers worked with that same commander for weeks without really gaining his confidence. Finally, Rogers recalls, “there was a Viet Cong sniper who seemed to nip away at us every evening after supper. I used to sneak down to a dike just behind him and try to catch him. Then I went to Saigon for a couple of days. When I got back, I noticed my counterpart grinning widely. That evening he told me that V. C. wasn’t going ‘Bang! Bang!’ any more. He had shot him during my absence. He showed me the brand-new Russian carbine he had taken off the sniper. I had it chromed and polished in Saigon and presented it to him. That’s when we first became really close friends.”
Last week Rogers was in action with his Vietnamese unit near Danang. But he will soon be going home to Sumneytown, Pa., and he will be sorry to leave. “These Vietnamese are brave people,” he says. “You go out on operation and — well — maybe things aren’t done quite the way you want them to be. But then, in the middle of a battle, one of these little characters comes grinning up to you and hands you a hot cup of coffee.”
Obituary
https://www.mcall.com/2001/08/14/lane-rogers/
Lane Rogers, 72, of Sumneytown, died Sunday, Aug. 12, in Lehigh Valley Hospital, Allentown.
He was a son of the late Richard and Mary (Bean) Rogers.
He joined the Marine Corps in 1947 and graduated from the United States Naval Academy in 1953. He spent more than 30 years in the military, attaining the rank of Lt. Colonel before retiring in 1979.
He was a partner in a bookstore called “The Book Place” in Skippack, Montgomery County.
He was a Marine Corps veteran of the Vietnam War, serving as an advisor to the South Vietnamese. He received the Silver Star, Bronze Star with “V,” Meritorious Service Medal, Air Medal, Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry (Division Level) and the Vietnamese Honor Medal, First Class.
He was a member of the Canadian Military Collectors Club. He was a life member of the Naval Institute.
Survivors: Brother, Charles T. of Worcester, Montgomery County; nieces, nephews.
Services: 2 p.m. Thursday, R.L. Williams Jr. Funeral Home, Skippack Pike and Cedars Road, Skippack. Call 1:30-2 p.m. Thursday.
Other Mentions & Co-Authored Publications
U.S. Marines in Vietnam - The landing and Buildup 1965, by Jack Shulimson and Major Charles M. Johnson, USMC, 15 June 1978. Preface
https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/U.S.%20Marines%20in%20Vietnam_The%20Landing%20and%20the%20Buildup%201965%20%20PCN%2019000307600_1.pdf
"The production of this volume has been a cooperative effort on the part of several members of the History and Museums Division. The manuscript was prepared under the editorial direction of Mr. Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief Historian of the History and Museums Division. Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers completed the final editing and also wrote the reconnaissance section of Chapter 11. "
U.S. Marines in Vietnam - Fighting the North Vietnamese, 1967, by Major Gary L. Tulfer, USMC, Lieutenant Colonel Lane Rogers, USMC, and V. Keith Fleming Jr., 1984
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